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Income, wealth, poverty 
and progress

John Hills
I FIRST HEARD of the idea of the Foundation sponsoring a review of 
what had been dramatic, but at the time underappreciated, changes 
in the distribution of income at the end of 1991. Richard Best and 
Janet Lewis, Director of Research, asked if I would review existing 
evidence and oversee a new research programme. The target was 
to be a major report by the autumn of 1994 (this eventually took 
the form of the second volume of the Inquiry Group’s report (Hills 
1995)). Taking this on involved balancing Richard’s priorities – a 
hard-hitting, short report and summary – with those of academic 
life for a book and journal articles.
Richard reluctantly accepted the book (Hills, 1996) was “part of 
the academics’ remuneration package”, and let it happen, but on 
condition that he didn’t see us writing it.
As the programme got underway, another idea emerged from 
Richard. Unaccountably, he seemed to feel that a research review 
by academics might not quite have the impact that the material 
deserved. What was needed was a ‘Great and Good Group’ to 
review the evidence and say what should be done about it. Its name 
transmuted into the Income and Wealth Inquiry Group, chaired by 
Sir Peter Barclay (with members who managed to be both great and 
good, rather than just one or the other).
Richard’s instincts were right: a group containing both the General 
Secretary of the Trades Union Congress (TUC) (John Monks) and 
the Director General of the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) 
(Howard Davies) could not easily be ignored. When the Inquiry’s 
report was published in early 1995 it had an immediate impact, 
not just in Parliament and through extensive media coverage, but 
on public opinion. As Figure 1 shows, the proportion of the public 
agreeing that “the gap between those with high income and those 
with low incomes” was too large peaked at 87 per cent a few 
months after the report came out.
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THIS CHAPTER LOOKS at how things have changed since the Inquiry 
report came out, in terms of both inequality and policy. It draws, 
among other things, on the recent books One hundred years of 
poverty and policy (Glennerster et al, 2004) and A more equal society? 
New Labour, poverty, inequality and exclusion (co-edited with Kitty 
Stewart, 2005). Both were supported by the Foundation (despite the 
outputs being books).
Joseph Rowntree Foundation Inquiry into Income and 
Wealth
The Inquiry did not pull its punches. As Sir Peter Barclay (1995) put 
it in his introduction,
Taken together, [the] ﬁndings paint a picture of a dramatic 
social and economic change in Britain over the 1980s, the 
scale and consequences of which are probably not yet fully 
appreciated by policy-makers or by the population at large.
It is worth recalling the main ﬁndings:
•   Income inequality in the UK grew rapidly between 1977 and 1990, 
reaching a higher level than recorded since the Second World War 
(as shown in the Gini coefﬁcient index of inequality, illustrated in 
Figure 1).
•   The pace at which inequality increased was faster than in any other 
industrialised country, apart from New Zealand.
•   Between 1979 and 1992 the poorest 20–30 per cent of the 
population failed to beneﬁt from economic growth, in contrast to 
the rest of the post-war period.
•   This increase in inequality was driven by causes that included the 
way low wages had hardly risen at all in real terms since 1978, 
while high wages grew by 50 per cent; the polarisation between 
two-earner and no-earner couples; and inequality within the self-
employed population.
•   Up to 1984, social security beneﬁts served to slow inequality 
growth compared to market incomes. But between 1984 and 1990 
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they did not, as price-linked beneﬁt levels fell behind the incomes 
of the working population.
•   The tax system, which might have been expected to slow inequality 
growth, did not do so. This was due to discretionary tax changes 
that shifted the burden of taxation from higher to lower and 
middle-income groups. 
•   Particular groups – such as certain minority ethnic groups – and 
particular parts of the country were hardest hit by these changes. 
The polarisation of income groups by housing tenure showed up 
on the ground as concentrations of people with low incomes in 
particular neighbourhoods.
•   Until the 1980s wealth inequalities had narrowed rapidly, but they 
then levelled out, with wealth remaining much more unequally 
distributed than income.
JRF Investment Portfolio 1988–2006
Figure 1: Inequality and attitudes to income gap, 1977 to 2004
Note: £258.9m at 30 June 2006
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The Inquiry argued that the growing gap between rich and poor 
was “damaging the social fabric” and that increasing inequality 
could damage the economy, rather than helping economic growth. It 
expressed particular concern for children being brought up in low-
income families, particularly those in neighbourhoods where most 
other families were poor.
In the words of the report:
Regardless of any moral arguments or feelings of altruism, 
everyone shares an interest in the cohesiveness of society. As 
the gaps between rich and poor grow, the problems of the 
marginalised groups that are being left behind rebound on 
the more comfortable majority.
What has happened since?
In the 11 years since the Inquiry reported, many things have changed. 
Not least among these is the election in 1997 of a new government, 
one of whose leading strategists declared that Britain would become 
“a more equal society” (Mandelson, 1997), and whose Prime Minister 
set a 20-year target to “end child poverty forever” (Blair, 1999).
Examining the ‘New Labour’ record there can be no doubt that 
different income groups have beneﬁted from economic growth 
and rising living standards. The upper panel of Figure 2 shows the 
pattern of income growth for each tenth of the income distribution 
between 1979 and 1994/95 (the average of the two ﬁnancial years, 
1994–95 and 1995–96). This was the comparison on which the 
Inquiry based many of its central conclusions (although the data 
available then only ran until 1991/92). We can see that – depending 
on whether the net income measure included or excluded housing 
costs – people in the middle of the poorest tenth (decile group) of 
incomes were only slightly better off, or even slightly worse off than 
their predecessors 16 years earlier. By contrast, the higher up the 
income distribution you went, the faster incomes had grown. Near 
the top, in the middle of the highest tenth of incomes, there had been 
an increase of around two thirds. Moving higher still, the top one per 
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cent of taxpayers accounted for nearly half the gain for their decile 
group. Indeed, most of this went to the top half per cent (Hills, 2004, 
table 2.6, based on Atkinson and Salverda, 2003). 
Figure 2: Changes in real net income by income group
(a) 1979 to 1994/95, UK
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The lower panel of Figure 2 shows what happened in the 10 years 
after the report was published. The picture is very different. Income 
growth has been much more widely spread with, if anything, slightly 
faster growth near the bottom of the distribution than near the top. 
Even so, more detailed ﬁgures show that the very bottom of the 
income distribution has continued to fall behind and incomes at the 
very top have grown faster.
Whichever way one looks at it, the very rapid growth of income 
inequality has been halted. On the other hand, there has been little 
reduction in the level that had taken the UK towards the top of 
the international income inequality league by the early 1990s. On 
measures that put a lot of weight on the very top and very bottom 
of the distribution, the distribution is slightly more unequal than it 
was in the mid-1990s. For instance, the Gini coefﬁcient index shown 
in Figure 1 reached nearly 34 per cent by 1990 – up by more than 
10 percentage points since 1977 – and has since ﬂuctuated around 
this level. However, on measures that compare those near the top 
with those near the bottom, the distribution has become slightly less 
unequal (Brewer et al, 2006, ﬁgure 2.9; Sefton and Sutherland, 2005, 
ﬁgure 11.1, comparing those a tenth of the way up the distribution 
with those nine tenths of the way up).
One of the impacts of this change has been a slow reduction in the 
proportion of the population deﬁned as living in poverty, using the 
‘moving target’ measurement of incomes (adjusted for household 
size) below particular percentages of mean or median income. 
Figure 3 illustrates two such measures. Data available to the Inquiry 
for the proportion of the population with less than half of the mean 
income suggested that about a tenth of the population were ‘poor’ in 
the 1960s, falling to 6 per cent in 1977, but rising to more than 20 per 
cent by 1990 (incomes before deducting housing costs). As the ﬁgure 
shows there was temporary reduction in the mid-1990s. Abolition 
of the Poll Tax and the progressive impact of tax rises after the 1992 
election meant that there was a small growth in living standards at 
the bottom while average living standards grew little in the mid-
1990s. This reduction in poverty rates was reversed in the late 1990s, 
taking the level back to 20 per cent, before a drop back again to 18 
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per cent in 2003–04 (the last year for which ﬁgures in this form have 
been published).
The second series in Figure 3 shows the measure on which the 
government’s own monitoring of progress is focused: the proportion 
of the population with incomes below 60 per cent of the median 
– in other words, a measurement that relates poverty to the living 
standards of the mainstream of the population. Poverty on this 
measure also grew rapidly in the 1980s. By 1991, it also showed 20 
per cent of the population as poor, falling to a plateau of 18 per cent 
in the late 1990s, and 16 per cent by 2004–05.
This last ﬁgure marked the lowest rate of poverty on this measure 
since before 1987. It reﬂected a reduction of 1 million in the number 
counted as poor since 1996–97. Measured by the alternative ofﬁcial 
measure – calculated after deducting housing costs – the fall was as 
much as 2.4 million (a decline in the poverty rate from 25 per cent 
to 20 per cent). Yet the publication of these ﬁgures in March 2006 
was not greeted by headlines hailing the achievement. Rather, the 
emphasis was on failure to achieve the more impressive target that 
Figure 3: Numbers in relative poverty, 1970 to 2004-05
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the government had set itself of a reduction in child poverty by a 
quarter between 1998–99 and 2004–05.
As highlighted by the Inquiry, families with dependent children 
were disproportionately affected by the increase in poverty in the 
1980s. Numbers of children in households with less than 60 per 
cent of median income peaked at 27 per cent (before housing costs) 
and 33 per cent (after housing costs) in 1992/93. By 1996–97, the 
ﬁrst measure had fallen to 25 per cent, but the  latter was still at 33 
per cent. Despite being the lowest ﬁgures since the late 1980s, the 
2004–05 ﬁgures of 19 and 27 per cent respectively represented falls 
of ‘only’ 700,000 children lifted out of poverty since 1998–99, rather 
than the target of more than a million.
A North American commentator would ﬁnd the description 
of these ﬁgures as ‘failure’ somewhat bizarre. Using something 
equivalent to the ofﬁcial poverty line in the US, which is ﬁxed in 
real terms and does not move with contemporary living standards, 
the UK ﬁgures would show a dramatic fall in poverty, halved for the 
population as a whole between 1996–97 and 2004–05, and more 
than halved for children.
However, the use of a relative poverty measurement in the UK 
does seem to reﬂect the way the population as a whole thinks of 
‘acceptable’ level of minimum incomes or what it takes to pay for 
the ‘necessities’ for modern life (Gordon et al, 2000; Hills, 2004, 
chapter 3). As society has become richer, so our view of what 
constitutes ‘poverty’ has shifted. With strong growth in typical 
living standards since 1997, this has made poverty reduction harder, 
although it has also created more resources with which to achieve it. 
In this respect, UK views appear more European than transatlantic; 
yet against European standards, our performance on poverty and 
inequality remains poor, albeit improving. In 1997, European Union 
ﬁgures put the UK’s (relative) child poverty rate at 27 per cent, the 
worst among the, then, 15 members of the EU (Hills and Stewart, 
2005, Ch. 14). (The EU ﬁgures involve different ways of comparing 
household incomes, in particular using an adjustment for household 
size that puts more weight in the needs of children than those lying 
behind the Department for Work and Pensions ﬁgures shown in 
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Figure 3. This produces a higher level of child poverty, but with 
similar trends over time.) The most recent ﬁgures, for 2004, put the 
UK at 22 per cent, marking the largest reduction in any EU country 
(HM Treasury, 2006, box 5.1). Nonetheless, the rate is still well above 
the EU 15 average of 19 per cent, and more than double the single-
ﬁgure rate that would allow the government to achieve its target of 
being ‘among the best in Europe’ by 2020.
Why has the picture changed?
Just as the growth in poverty and income inequality up to the 
early 1990s had multiple causes, so their reduction or halting have 
occurred for a mixture of reasons. First and foremost, it is important 
to realise that the pressures from inequalities in the labour market 
have relented little. One of the drivers of growing inequality in 
income has been the increasing dispersion of earnings. As Figure 4 
shows, the ratio between the cut-off points for the best and worst-
paid tenths of men rose from 2.4 in 1979 to 3.2 to the time of the JRF 
Inquiry. But since then this measure has continued to rise – reaching 
3.7 in the most recent ﬁgures (calculated in a slightly different way) 
for 2005.
Figure 4: Dispersion of full-time weekly earnings, 1968 to 2005
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For women, the increase in earnings dispersion started later, but 
has also continued since the mid-1990s. Interestingly, too, it is only 
among women workers that some effect from the introduction of 
a National Minimum Wage in 1999 can be seen. This is because it 
was set at too low a level to affect men even only a tenth of the way 
up the wage distribution. The ‘cut-off ’ for the worst paid tenth of 
women working full time was 58.3 per cent of the median in 1999, 
and still only 58.4 per cent of it in 2005. However, the best-paid tenth 
of women have continued to pull away from the median. At the same 
time, women working full time have continued their painfully slow 
catch-up in average wages with men. The deﬁcit fell from 36 per cent 
in the mid-1970s, to 27 per cent in 1994 and 21 per cent in 2005. 
Hourly earnings of women in part-time paid work remain far lower 
than men working full time.
While wage inequality has grown wider within the employed 
population, it is important to recognise the change of context brought 
about by a major reduction in unemployment since the mid-1990s. 
This has fallen from over 10 per cent in 1993 to under 5 per cent 
in 2005 (on the International Labour Organization measure). The 
overall employment rate has increased from 70.5 to 74.5 per cent in 
the same period (HM Treasury, 2006, chart 4.1). Moreover, for lone 
parents, who are at particularly high risk of poverty, the employment 
rate has risen from 41 to 57 per cent (HM Treasury, 2006, chart 
4.7). More generally, 19 per cent of children were living in a family 
without income from paid work in 2004–05, compared to 24 per 
cent in 1994–95 (DWP, 2006, table B3). 
In contrast with the 1980s, when nearly all pressures were towards 
more unequal incomes, these factors – and others, such as the growing 
importance of private pensions for some retirees, but not others 
– have pushed the distribution of market incomes in different ways. 
Figure 5 suggests that there has been something of a stalemate in the 
distribution of market incomes (in this case between households, 
rather than individuals as in earlier ﬁgures). The inequality index for 
market incomes rose from 43 per cent in 1977 to 52 per cent in 1992. 
In the 10 years since then, this ﬁgure has ﬂuctuated closely around 
this level.
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Adding in social security beneﬁts (to give ‘gross incomes’) and 
deducting direct taxes (to give ‘disposable incomes’) serves to reduce 
inequality by comparison with market incomes. But the inﬂuence 
of both these factors has also ﬂuctuated since the early-1990s, as the 
ﬁgure shows. Again, the picture for most of the decade is something 
of a stalemate (as it is for ‘post-tax’ income, which adjusts for the 
impact of indirect taxes), although the 2004–05 single-year ﬁgure 
for disposable income in this series is, at 32 per cent, the lowest 
since 1986.
Policy inﬂuences
The tide of rising income inequality and poverty has been halted 
in the 11 years since the Inquiry, but progress in reducing them has 
been patchy. As an overall characterisation, some parts of the bottom 
have caught up with the middle – hence notable falls in child and 
also in pensioner poverty. Those near the top have ceased to pull 
away from the middle. However, some of those at the very bottom – 
notably working-age adults without children who are dependent on 
social security beneﬁts – have continued to fall behind the middle. 
Figure 5: Trends in distribution of income between households, 
1977 to 2004–05
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Meanwhile, those at the very top have continued to accelerate away 
from the rest.
This picture, and the difﬁculty of reducing it to a single index or 
description, is perhaps unsurprising given the policy mix since Labour 
came to power in 1997. An instructive comparison can be made 
between the government’s record and the policy recommendations 
of the Income and Wealth Inquiry in 1995. More than half the 
46 speciﬁc measures proposed by the Inquiry were adopted, and 
only six have clearly not been followed (Glennerster et al, 2004, 
chapter 7, updated for the policy changes announced in the 2006 
pensions White Paper, that were in line with the Inquiry). Notable 
developments include: the ‘New Deal’ employment measures; more 
generous tax credits for those in work and for families with children; 
the National Minimum Wage; measures to ease the transition into 
work for those on beneﬁts; more generous treatment for the poorest 
pensioners; restructuring of National Insurance to help the low paid; 
and a series of measures aimed at helping the prospects of those 
living in marginalised areas. All of these would have been welcomed 
by the Inquiry.
Policy has also recognised the multifaceted and interlinked nature 
of poverty, exclusion and disadvantage, and action has been taken 
across a broad front. Moreover, the evidence we have on the impact 
of initiatives taken since 1997 is that they have tended to have positive 
effects (Hills and Stewart, 2005). So why have there not been clearer 
signs of progress?
One reason is that some of the polarising pressures have continued 
unabated (as Figure 4 illustrated for wage inequality). Indeed 
some of them have become even more entrenched. For instance, 
educational achievements continue to matter more in the labour 
market, and those achievements depend even more than in the past 
on how successful people’s parents were. Secondly, while continuous 
economic growth for more than a decade has helped relieve some 
pressures – in particular, unemployment – it has continuously raised 
the living standards and aspirations of the mainstream. With them, 
the income levels required to prevent people being left behind or 
excluded have also risen. As a result, huge efforts have been needed 
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simply to stand still. Put another way, without the positive policy 
impacts of the past nine years, things would have got even worse.
But it is also important to recognise the importance of one of 
the Inquiry’s recommendations that has not been followed. In the 
Inquiry’s view, indeﬁnite price indexation of social security beneﬁts 
for those depending on them was not acceptable, and it argued that 
beneﬁts should rise by more than inﬂation at a time when living 
standards in general were rising (Barclay, 1995, p 46). By contrast, 
the default policy since 1997 was to follow the government’s 
Conservative predecessors in leaving the value of social security 
beneﬁts ﬁxed in real terms. Only for favoured groups – such as low-
income pensioners and families with children – have beneﬁts been 
increased in real terms. The consequences can be seen in Figure 6, 
which shows the value of particular beneﬁts as a percentage of average 
earnings. Back in the 1970s, a single person received Supplementary 
Beneﬁt (now Income Support) or ﬂat rate Unemployment Beneﬁt 
(now Jobseeker’s Allowance) worth around 20 per cent of average 
earnings. By 2004, the equivalent was worth only 11 per cent of 
average earnings. In the early 1980s, the basic pension was worth a 
quarter of average earnings, now its (generally) price-linked value 
has fallen below 16 per cent of average earnings. Of those shown, 
Figure 6: Benefit values in relation to average earnings, 1971 to 2004
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only Income Support (now the Guarantee Credit) for pensioners has 
(nearly) regained its relative value of the late 1970s.
Putting this together, what appears to be little change in poverty 
and inequality in the past decade is in fact the result of a collision 
of factors pushing hard in opposing directions. Macro-economic 
success and targeted employment programmes have helped reduce 
worklessness. Particular initiatives such as the new tax credits or the 
Pension Credit have meant that low-income families with children 
and pensioners have gained ground on the population as a whole. 
Low-income neighbourhoods have beneﬁted from both targeted 
programmes and from overall economic growth. But at the same 
time, many of the fundamental drivers of inequality have continued 
pushing the other way. So, unless they are the beneﬁciaries of 
particular changes each year, those who rely on state transfers for 
large parts of their income will continue to be left behind.
This pattern is set to continue. When constructing its long-term 
projections of public spending over the coming decades as the 
population ages, the Treasury has assumed that – with the exception 
of the Guarantee Credit means-tested minimum for pensioners – all 
social security beneﬁts will remain price-linked indeﬁnitely, even as 
earnings are assumed to grow by 2.5 per cent in real terms each year – 
which would represent a doubling in 28 years (HM Treasury, 2005).
The problems caused by indeﬁnite price indexation of the basic 
pension were highlighted by the Pensions Commission (2005), 
of which the author was a member. In response the government’s 
pensions White Paper promises to return to earnings indexation 
from 2012 (assuming ‘resources allow’, but in any case in the next 
Parliament). But the problems extend to the rest of the social security 
system and the implications for poverty are even stronger. For a single 
person aged under 25, Income Support rates are currently £45.50 
per week. This could be the income (after rent) that a single woman 
receives through a pregnancy. The assumption built into public 
spending planning is that this will have reduced to the equivalent, 
relative to contemporary living standards, of £35.50 by 2016, and 
just £23 by 2034. Yet the (after housing costs) poverty line for a single 
person is currently around £110 per week.
I N C O M E ,  W E A LT H ,  P O V E RT Y  A N D  P R O G R E S S
90
For low-income families with children, the government’s medium-
term target of halving child poverty by 2010 compared with 1998–
99 has led to a promise that the child element of Child Tax Credit 
will be increased at least in line with earnings until the end of the 
current Parliament. But other parts of the system of support for 
low-income families remain price-linked at best – and recently the 
‘family element’ of Child Tax Credit has been frozen in cash terms. 
This means that total family incomes from transfers will continue to 
slip behind other incomes.
For instance, a couple with two children receiving Income 
Support would have a total weekly income in 2006–07 of £197.40, 
of which only a third, £67.70 is earnings-linked. This total is already 
only about 68 per cent of the (after housing costs) poverty line for a 
family of this kind, but can be expected to fall to 64 per cent or less 
by 2010 on current policies. For a couple with low earnings entitled 
to the maximum Child Tax Credit, current support including Child 
Beneﬁt would be £107.30 per week – about 37 per cent of what they 
need to get above the poverty line. By 2010 current policies suggest 
this help would fall to 35 per cent of what would be needed to escape 
poverty.
Short of a complete transformation in employment rates, it is a 
little hard, in these circumstances, to see how poverty rates will be 
held at their current levels, let alone reduced substantially to meet 
the government’s target. Indeed, in his review for the Foundation, 
Donald Hirsch (2006, p 54) concludes that current tax and beneﬁt 
policies, even combined with welfare to work changes, “are only just 
enough to prevent [child] poverty from rising again, and not nearly 
enough to cut it by around a million by 2010” (as required by the 
government’s next target). On the other hand, a feasible package of 
measures involving faster increases in the value of Child Tax Credits, 
particularly for larger families, could achieve this, at an annual cost 
rising to £4.3 billion compared to current policies (increasing its cost 
by 0.1 per cent of GDP compared to what would happen with simple 
earnings indexation).
J O H N  H I L L S
91
Wealth
Despite its name, the distribution of wealth featured less than 
prominently in the Income and Wealth Inquiry’s ﬁnal report. This was 
partly because there were fewer data and research ﬁndings available, 
and less to say about them. It was also because, on the surface, what 
had happened to the distribution of wealth was relatively dull. Figure 
7 shows that after a dramatic reduction in wealth inequality since 
the ﬁrst part of the 20th century, the overall distribution of wealth 
changed little between the mid-1970s and the early 1990s. However, 
this was a much higher level of inequality than existed for income. 
For instance, the top tenth of wealth owners accounted for half of 
all marketable wealth in both 1976 and 1992, compared with just 
over a quarter of disposable income (Hills, 2004, table 2.5). The Gini 
coefﬁcient for marketable wealth – 66 per cent in 1992 – was twice 
the inequality index for income, but had changed little since 1976.
However, the ﬁgure shows that this stable pattern ended just as 
the data available to the Inquiry ﬁnished. By 2002, the share of the 
top tenth had risen from 50 to 57 per cent of marketable wealth, and 
that of the top one per cent by a third from 18 per cent to 24 per 
Figure 7: Distribution of marketable wealth, 1960 to 2003
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cent (although provisional single-year estimates for 2003, after the 
falls in the stock market, suggest sharp falls to 53 and 21 per cent 
respectively).
One explanation is that the stable pattern through the 1980s 
disguised two different effects. As in previous decades, ‘old’ 
wealth inequality may have continued to decline, but this was 
offset by an accumulation of ‘new’ wealth by those with massively 
increased incomes (and savings potential) at the top of the income 
distribution. Since the early 1990s, the latter effect has dominated 
– not surprisingly, since those whose incomes increased after 1980 
have had 20 years to convert their gains into assets.
Looking to the future, inequalities in wealth may be one of the 
crucial factors making it harder to equalise life chances. As one 
example of the advantages conferred by wealth holdings, Gibbons 
and Machin (2006) have demonstrated how proximity to a well-
performing state primary school in London and the South East can 
add £61,000 to the price of a typical house. 
Conclusion
Looking back to the mid-1990s, there are several things about today’s 
situation that would have seemed remarkable 10 years ago. Not least 
among them is the seriousness with which government has taken 
problems of poverty, deprivation, and the concept of ‘social exclusion’. 
The sheer range of policy initiatives taken to tackle them is striking, as 
are the halting of the dramatic growth of income inequality and the 
reduction of child poverty by between 20–30 per cent (depending on 
the measure used) from its peak of the early 1990s. There has been 
the huge reduction in the level of unemployment (although not of 
economic inactivity) and a sustained increase in the real incomes 
of many of those at the bottom of the distribution for the ﬁrst time 
since the early 1970s.
But other things would be less surprising: including the continued 
growth in the gap between those with high earnings and others and 
the way in which the value of many social security beneﬁts continues 
to lag behind the living standards of the rest of the population. For 
those who looked for a fairer, less divided society a decade ago, the fact 
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that the positive efforts of the past 10 years have only been enough to 
stem the growth of income inequality, and slowly to reduce poverty, 
is sobering. The forces pushing towards widening inequality are as 
strong as ever, making the Joseph Rowntree Foundation’s mission to 
search out the causes of poverty and social disadvantage as urgent 
as ever.
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